SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreastof some of the more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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FAMILY

LAW-PARTIES CAN CONTRACT TO SUBMIT ALIMONY AND

CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS TO BINDING ARBITRATION-Faherty

v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984).
After seventeen years of marriage and with four dependent
children, Susan and Roger Faherty were divorced. Prior to the
divorce and with the aid of counsel, they negotiated a property
settlement agreement that was incorporated into the final divorce
decree. Not only did that agreement specify the manner in which
the Fahertys' assets were to be distributed, but it also contained a
clause that provided that the Fahertys would submit to arbitration any financial disputes that arose from the agreement's provisions.
Under the agreement, the rules of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) would govern the arbitration process and the arbitrator's decision would be binding. 97 N.J. at
102, 477 A.2d at 1259. The parties recognized that Roger's ability to pay child and spousal support was influenced by his variable earnings as an investment banker, and, accordingly, the
agreement provided that, under certain circumstances, the support could be adjusted. Id. at 103, 477 A.2d at 1259.
When Roger fell behind in his alimony and child support
payments, Susan moved in the chancery division for an order fixing the arrearages and compelling discovery of Roger's business
records. Roger cross-moved to have the arrearages submitted to
arbitration and to have the amount of future payments reevaluated in view of changed circumstances. The chancery division ordered that the issues be arbitrated in accordance with the
agreement. Susan alleged the arrearages to be $25,400 for child
support and $25,000 for alimony. The arbitrator fixed the
amounts owed for alimony at $37,648 and for child support at
$12,284, and he denied any reduction in future alimony or child
support. Id. at 104, 477 A.2d at 1260. The chancery division
confirmed the arbitration award and denied Roger's motion to
vacate the award. Id. at 105, 477 A.2d at 1260. Despite the fact
that it was he who initially sought to compel arbitration, Roger
appealed, challenging both the validity of the arbitration clause
and the confirmation of the arbitration award. He claimed that
the arbitration clause should not be enforced because, as a matter of public policy, disputes over alimony and child support
should be settled by the courts; he also claimed that the arbitration award was erroneous. The appellate division found all of
the issues raised by Roger to be without merit, and the New
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Jersey Supreme Court granted certification. See id. at 105, 477
A.2d at 1260-61.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for a unanimous court, observed
that while marital separation agreements are generally enforceable, id. at 105, 477 A.2d at 1261, and arbitration is a valid means
for resolving contractual disagreements, id. at 107, 477 A.2d at
1261-62, it was the first time that the issue of the enforceability of
an arbitration clause within a separation agreement had been
before the supreme court. Id. at 105, 477 A.2d at 1261. After
considering the sensitive nature of domestic disputes and the advantages of party autonomy in such matters, the court held that
spouses may in their separation agreement bind themselves to
submit alimony disputes to arbitration. Id. at 107-08, 477 A.2d at
1262. The court also noted that public policy in fact favors,
rather than frowns upon, such agreements. Id. at 107, 477 A.2d
at 1262.
With respect to arbitration of child support and custody disputes, however, Justice Garibaldi recognized that courts have a
parens patriae duty to protect the best interests of children. Thus,
although the court found that child support disputes can be
made subject to the arbitration process, it held that the trial court
should conduct a special review of an arbitrator's award when the
child's best interests might be adversely affected. Id. at 109-10,
477 A.2d at 1263. Justice Garibaldi observed that such an adverse effect could occur only when the arbitrator's award is less
than the amount of support that is requested and when the
child's standard of living is thereby actually and materially affected. Id. at 110, 477 A.2d at 1263. The court remarked that,
under such circumstances, a de novo review is essential. Id. at 10910, 477 A.2d at 1263. In addition, while the court did not decide
the issues of whether child custody and visitation rights could be
made subject to binding arbitration, Justice Garibaldi indicated
that the court's policy with respect to child support would probably be equally applicable in such cases. Id. at 110, 477 A.2d at
1263.
In an attempt to guide future arbitration in the area, Justice
Garibaldi urged that all findings of fact made by the arbitrator be
preserved in written form in order to facilitate modification of
alimony or child support based on changed circumstances. Id. at
111, 477 A.2d at 1264. Finally, with regard to the specific facts
before it, the court affirmed the arbitration award with minor
modifications. Id. at 112-13, 477 A.2d at 1264-65.
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The Faherty decision provides divorcing spouses with a viable
alternative to litigating financial disputes. More importantly,
where children are involved, the court has not foresaken its responsibility to protect their best interests. With respect to child
support payments, a neutral arbitrator should be as competent as
a court in assessing both the child's needs and the parent's relative ability to provide for them. In addition, protection of the
child's needs is further insured by the court's authority to review
disputed arbitration awards.
CarlaJ. Crusiws

CONTRACTS-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
ANCE-IN ABSENCE
TRACT,

CONTRACTOR

WORKMANLIKE PERFORM-

OF NONASSIGNABILiTY
NOT

IMMUNIZED

CLAUSE IN CON-

FROM

CONTRACTUAL

OBLIGATION TO PERFORM WORK IN WORKMANLIKE, NON-NEGLIGENT MANNER BECAUSE ORIGINAL OWNER OR BUYER TRANS-

FERRED PROPERTY TO SUCCESsOR-Aronsohn

v. Mandara, 98

N.J. 92, 484 A.2d 675 (1984).
When Mr. and Mrs. Kawash decided to add a patio to their
Wyckoff, New Jersey home, they employed the Mandara Masonry
Corporation (Mandara) to do the construction work. The patio
was completed in 1974 by William S. Mandara, the owner of the
company; his father, Salvatore Mandara; and three employees.
98 N.J. at 95, 484 A. 2d at 676-77. In August 1975, the plaintiffs,
Mr. and Mrs. Aronsohn, purchased the Kawash home. Id. at 96,

484 A. 2d at 677. Their purchase agreement afforded them both
the right to make an engineering inspection and the correspond-

ing right to cancel the contract upon an unsatisfactory report. Id.
at 100, 484 A. 2d at 679. In 1978, the Aronsohns discovered a
separation between the patio and the wall of the house. They
also noticed that the slate slabs of the patio floor were beginning
to rise, and that the patio's outside wall was starting to buckle.
The Aronsohns then brought suit against Mandara and Salvatore
Mandara, alleging breaches of express and implied warranties, as
well as strict liability and negligence claims. Id. at 96, 484 A. 2d
at 677.
Although the plaintiffs' expert witness testified at trial that
the patio had been constructed improperly, the court granted the
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defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 96-97, 484 A. 2d at 677. It
found the express warranty claim to be without merit because the
defendants' construction contract had been with the Kawashes,
and thus there was no privity of contract between the defendant
and the Aronsohns. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' negligence claim, finding that, because the plaintiffs were seeking recovery for an economic loss, rather than for injury to their
persons or property, their action sounded in contract. Finally,
the trial judge reasoned that because the suit involved a service
contract, neither an implied warranty nor a strict liability claim
was appropriate. Id. at 97, 484 A. 2d at 677. The appellate division affirmed the trial court's judgment.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the Aronsohns' petition for certification, id. at 97, 484 A. 2d at 678, and held that in
the absence of a nonassignability clause in the contract, a contractor should not be "immunized from his contractual obligation to have performed his work in a workmanlike, non-negligent
manner simply because the original owner or buyer transferred
the property to a successor." Id. at 99, 484 A. 2d at 678. The
court remanded the matter for a new trial to determine whether
Mandara had built the patio in a workmanlike manner. Id. at 10708, 484 A. 2d at 683.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Schreiber observed
that when there exists no express contractual provision with respect to workmanship, the law implies a covenant of reasonably
good and workmanlike performance. He thus reasoned that the
contract between Mandara and the Kawashes included an implied
promise by Mandara to construct the patio in a workmanlike
manner. Id. at 98, 484 A. 2d at 678. In determining to whom
such an implied warranty runs, the court opined that the requirement of contractual privity should be abandoned and that a
builder's liability should extend to third persons, such as subsequent purchasers who sue for breach of the implied covenant of
good workmanship. Justice Schreiber believed that to require
privity under circumstances such as those before him would defeat the purpose of the implied warranty of good workmanship
and, in effect, would bar the only remedy that a homeowner
might have against the contractor's negligent workmanship. The
court reasoned that the fortuity of a change of ownership should
not relieve the contractor of liability for unworkmanlike construction, nor should the innocent purchaser be left without recourse
for his financial losses. Id. at 102-03, 484 A. 2d at 680.
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Justice Schreiber noted, however, that a contractor can limit
his obligations to a subsequent purchaser by including such a restriction in his agreement with the original owner, provided that
such a limitation comports with public policy. Id. at 103, 484 A.
2d at 680-81. The court, however, observed that there was nothing in the Kawashes' contract with Mandara that prohibited assignment of their contractual rights. Id. at 99, 484 A. 2d at 679.
Justice Schreiber reasoned that the Kawashes' conveyance of
their property indicated their intent to assign to the Aronsohns
all of their contractual rights associated with the property, which
included the right of action for breach of contract.
The supreme court also analogized the defendants' implied
promise to construct the patio in a workmanlike manner to a real
property covenant that runs with the land, and it found that the
benefits of both "should flow with the ownership despite the absence of privity between the contractor and the present owner."
Id. at 101, 484 A. 2d at 679-80. The court held, however, that the
Aronsohns could not maintain a cause of action on the theory of
implied warranty of habitability. Id. at 103, 484 A. 2d at 681.
Justice Schreiber identified habitability as "synonomous with
suitability for living purposes," id. at 104, 484 A. 2d at 681, and
he concluded that the evidence did not establish that the patio
"constituted a vital living element in the home." Id. at 105, 484
A. 2d at 682. The court also held that because no express provisions in the Kawashes' agreement had been violated, the Aronsohns could not maintain their action on the basis of express
warranty theory. Id. at 103, 484 A. 2d at 681.
Finally, the court stated that it was not obliged to decide the
validity of the Aronsohns' negligence claim, because no personal
injuries or property damage had been alleged, and because such
negligence, if established, would constitute a breach of the implied covenant of workmanlike performance, which is a contract
action. Justice Schreiber noted, however, that New Jersey decisions have established that a contractor's liability can be
grounded on a negligence theory, despite the absence of privity
between the parties, if the plaintiff has suffered injuries to his
person or to his property as a proximate result of a contractor's
negligent workmanship. Id. at 106-07, 484 A. 2d at 682-83.
In closing, the court found that because there was conflicting
evidence as to whether the defendant had built the patio in a
workmanlike manner, and because the plaintiffs had established a
prima facie case, a new trial was necessary. Justice Schreiber ad-
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ded, however, that because the Aronsohns' purchase agreement
had included the right to conduct an engineering inspection of
the premises they could not recover damages for a defective condition that was readily apparent on or before the date on which
title was transferred. Id. at 107-08, 484 A. 2d at 683. The court
reasoned that the Aronsohns should be presumed to have taken
such defects into account when they agreed to the sale price. Id.
at 100, 484 A. 2d at 679.
Under the Aronsohn court's holding, an innocent homeowner
is protected from latent defects caused by the negligent workmanship of a contractor who has made an "improvement" on the
property while it was in the possession of a previous owner. The
contractor, however, can prevent such suits by carefully drafting
an agreement that includes a nonassignability clause and other
reasonable restrictions on his obligations.
Unfortunately, the court has provided little guidance as to
exemplary restrictions that would comport with public policy.
The New Home Warranty and Builders' Registration Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-1 to -12 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985), requires that builders of new homes provide the person for whom
the home is built with warranties of one, two, or ten years, depending upon the part of the home that is warranted. See 98 N.J.
at 99 n.3, 484 A. 2d at 678 n.3. The regulations, which delineate
the subject matter of those warranties, require a one year warranty on attached patios. Id. The provisions of the Act, however,
extend only to the initial occupants of a new house and to those
who purchase directly from the initial occupants. See Id. at 99,
484 A. 2d at 678. In light of these legislative enactments, a carefully drafted agreement, which includes a nonassignability clause
and a warranty of specific duration, may adequately protect the
contractor while conforming to public policy.
John P. MacPhee
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LIABILITY IN TORT-MANUFAC-

TURER'S DUTY TO WARN NOT EXTINGUISHED BY USER'S AcTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF DANGER-Campos v. Firestone Tire &

Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 485 A.2d 305 (1984).
On November 1, 1978, Armando Campos suffered severe injuries while inflating a tire on a rim assembly, which had been
purchased by his employer, Theurer Atlantic, Inc. (Theurer),
from the defendant, Firestone Tire & Rubber Company (Firestone). The accident occurred when Campos reached inside a
safety cage, which enclosed the rim assembly, in an attempt to
secure a locking element that was allowing pressurized air to escape from a tire. 98 N.J. at 202, 485 A.2d at 307. He was injured
when the assembly exploded. Id. at 203, 485 A.2d at 307. Campos sued Firestone in strict liability in tort, alleging defects both
in the design of the rim assembly and in the warnings that were
provided to Theurer. Id., 485 A.2d at 308.
Prior to the accident, Firestone had provided Campos's employer with manuals that described proper tire preparation and
had also given Theurer a chart containing printed safety warnings. That chart had been posted on the wall in the plaintiff's
workplace. However, Campos, a Portuguese immigrant, alleged
that the warnings were ineffective because he was unable to read
English. Id., 485 A.2d at 307. Despite the fact that he was unable
to read the written warnings, Campos did have actual knowledge
of the danger of explosion that was associated with the use of the
rim assembly because he had been involved in a similar workplace accident in 1972. On that occasion, Campos had been injured, although less severely, when he inserted his hand near the
rim assembly as air was being forced into a tire. Id., 485 A.2d at
308.
At trial, the jury rejected the plaintiffs design defect claim.
It did, however, find that Firestone had failed to warn adequately
of the danger associated with operation of the rim assembly and
that this failure to warn was the proximate cause of Campos's
injury. Id. at 203-04, 485 A.2d at 308. On appeal, a divided appellate division reversed. See Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
192 NJ. Super. 251, 469 A.2d 943 (App. Div. 1983), rev'd and
remanded, 98 N.J. 198, 485 A.2d 305 (1984). The majority opinion of the appellate division emphasized that no duty to warn
should be imposed on a manufacturer where the danger was obvious and the user had knowledge of it. Id. at 261-62, 469 A.2d
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at 949. The dissent, however, asserted that a plaintiff's subjective
knowledge of danger is not relevant to the issue of duty to warn
and should only be considered with respect to the question of
proximate causation. Id. at 269-70, 469 A.2d at 953 (Dreier, J.,
dissenting).
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Schreiber, the
New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate division and remanded the case for a new trial on the failure
to warn issue. 98 N.J. at 211, 485 A.2d at 312. The supreme
court noted that there was no question that the manufacturer
possessed knowledge of the risk associated with the use of its
product. Accordingly, Firestone had a duty to issue a warning to
foreseeable users that would be sufficient to protect them from
hidden dangers. Id. at 206, 485 A.2d at 309. Justice Schreiber
also asserted that, in New Jersey, the obviousness of a danger is
merely one factor to be considered in determining whether a
duty to warn exists. Even where the danger is patent, the court
noted, a manufacturer is not necessarily relieved of its duty to
warn. Id. at 207, 485 A.2d at 310. The supreme court concluded
that, under the circumstances of the instant case, Firestone had a
duty to warn the plaintiff that placing his hand in the cage surrounding the rim assembly was potentially dangerous. In addition, the court found that, in view of Campos's inability to read
English, the written warnings provided by Firestone were inadequate and that warnings in pictorial form should have been used.
Id. at 208, 485 A.2d at 310.
The supreme court did not accept Firestone's argument that
the issue of failure to warn was irrelevant because of the plaintiff's actual knowledge of the danger. Holding that a manufacturer's duty to warn cannot be extinguished by an injured user's
perception of danger, the court agreed with the dissenting opinion of the appellate division that the plaintiff's awareness of the
danger was relevant to the issue of proximate causation, rather
than to the issue of duty to warn. Justice Schreiber noted that it
was for a jury to decide whether Firestone's failure to warn was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 209, 485
A.2d at 311. In the court's view, the trial judge had not properly
instructed the jury that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving
that the accident would not have occurred had there been a
proper warning. The case, therefore, was remanded for a new
trial. Id. at 210-11, 485 A.2d at 311-12.
In holding that Campos's awareness of the danger associated
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with operation of the rim assembly was relevant to the question
of proximate causation, rather than to the manufacturer's duty to
warn, the supreme court has properly focused its strict liability
inquiry. Applying this rationale to the plaintiffs strict liability
claim, the court refused to modify the manufacturer's duty to
place only defect-free products with adequate warnings in the
marketplace. As a practical matter, the court's decision may be of
limited value to injured plaintiffs, because their preexisting
knowledge of danger may still be used by defendants to prove
that the absence of a warning was not the proximate cause of
their injuries. Of additional significance is the court's observation that warnings in graphic or symbolic form may be appropriate in view of the many unskilled and semiskilled employees in
the workplace who cannot read English. This requirement was
never fully developed by Justice Schreiber, who instead focused
his discussion on the causation element, observing that there was
evidence that the plaintiffs instinctive act would not have been
prevented even with a proper pictorial warning. Accordingly,
more extensive judicial consideration is warranted on the issue of
the adequacy of written warnings in workplaces filled with illiterate and semiliterate workers.
Marianne M. DeMarco

ETHICS-BREACH OF ATTORNEY'S DUTY TO ADVERSARY RESULTS
IN LIABILITY FOR MALPRACTICE SUIT BROUGHT AGAINST AD-

VERSARY-Malewich v. Zacharias, 196 NJ. Super. 372, 482
A.2d 951 (App. Div. 1984).
When Patricia Malewich decided to bring a matrimonial action against her husband, Robert Malewich, she retained Lazlo
Zacharias, Jr., to represent her. 196 N.J. Super. at 374, 482 A.2d
at 952. Although Mr. Zacharias received notification that a trial
date had been set, he relied upon the representation of his adversary, Jon Auty, that, unless Auty notified him otherwise, the case
would be adjourned. Id. at 374-76, 482 A.2d at 952-53. Auty
never contacted Zacharias, but the case went to trial as scheduled. When Auty informed the court that Zacharias would not
appear, a default judgment was entered against the plaintiff. Mr.
Malewich, however, was allowed to proceed on his counterclaim.
Id. at 376, 482 A.2d at 953. The ex parte proceeding resulted in
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an order dissolving the marriage, an equitable distribution of the
parties' assets, and an assessment of tort damages against the
plaintiff. Id. at 375, 482 A.2d at 952.
Patricia Malewich subsequently discharged Zacharias and retained another attorney, Marc Allen Chase, who "attempted to
vacate the judgment and negotiated a settlement." Id. at 374,
482 A.2d at 952. Mrs. Malewich, represented by Chase, then
brought a legal malpractice action against Zacharias for failing
either to appear for trial or to notify her of the original trial date.
She asserted that if she had been advised of the trial date she
would have been present at trial to refute claims against her and
that she could have proven claims against her husband if
Zacharias had properly represented her. Zacharias, in turn, filed
a third-party action against Auty and Chase, which the trial court
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The appellate division granted Zacharias's motion for
leave to appeal and affirmed the trial court's order with respect to
Chase, finding that as a matter of law he had owed no duty to
Zacharias. Id. at 375-76, 482 A.2d at 952-53. The appellate division also reversed the dismissal of the third-party complaint
against Auty and remanded the matter to the trial court. Id. at
377, 482 A.2d at 954.
Writing for the court, Judge Dreier explained that if Auty
had, in fact, misrepresented to the trial court what had transpired
between him and Zacharias, Auty was in violation of Disciplinary
Rules 7-102(A)(2), (5), and (7), which require that attorneys
make only true statements to a court. Id. at 376, 482 A.2d at 953.
In addition, Judge Dreier applied the standard of duty based on
reasonableness that was set forth in Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N.J.
450, 136 A.2d 887 (1957), and found that because a member of
the bar may reasonably rely on assertions made by an opposing
attorney, Auty owed Zacharias a duty to act in good faith, the
breach of which could render Auty liable for all or part of the
malpractice claim against Zacharias. 196 N.J. Super. at 375-77,
482 A.2d at 952-53. In dicta, the Malewich court reemphasized
that there is a "covenant of good faith and fair dealing" implicit
in every contract, and it observed that such a standard must be
applied even more stringently among members of the bar, whose
conduct is governed by a specific code of ethics. Id. at 377, 482
A.2d at 953.
The Malewich decision clearly serves to reinforce the importance of maintaining a high ethical standard among members of
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the legal profession. More specifically, the court underscores the
often forgotten fact that lawyers owe a duty not only to their clients and to the court, but also to each other. By creating a rule
whereunder an attorney can be made to pay damages to a
wronged colleague, the case hopefully will deter lawyers from exercising anything other than the utmost good faith when dealing
with their adversaries.
Darlene Pereksta

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-SENTENCING-GRAVES

ACT

MINI-

MUM PAROLE INELIGIBILITY APPLICABLE TO ACCOMPLICE TO

ARMED ROBBERY--State v. White, 98 N.J. 122, 484 A.2d 691
(1984).

In June 1981, Oliver White and three other men participated
in two armed robberies. In both instances, White knew that his
companions were armed, although he himself did not carry a
gun. He was subsequently convicted of two counts of armed robbery and was sentenced to two concurrent, fifteen year terms. In
addition, pursuant to the Graves Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:436(c) (West 1982), White was sentenced to five years of parole ineligibility. The Graves Act provides that a person who is convicted of, among other things, armed robbery and who either
" 'used or was in possession' of a firearm' " during the commission of the crime, shall be sentenced to a minimum period of
parole ineligibility. 98 N.J. at 127-28, 484 A.2d at 693 (quoting
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(c)).
White appealed his parole ineligibility sentence on the
ground that he neither used nor possessed a weapon during the
robberies And that, therefore, his conduct did not fall within the
scope of the Graves Act. Despite White's contentions, the appellate division affirmed the sentence, reasoning that White was an
equally culpable accomplice since he knew that his cohorts possessed firearms. Id. at 127, 484 A.2d at 693. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted White's petition for certification in order
to clarify the circumstances under which the sentencing requirements of the Graves Act apply to an accomplice. Id. at 126, 484
A.2d at 693.
The supreme court affirmed the appellate division's holding.
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Id. at 132, 484 A.2d at 696. Justice Schreiber, writing for the
majority, determined that an accomplice is subject to the sanctions of the Graves Act if (1) he is convicted of an armed Graves
Act offense, or (2) he is convicted of an unarmed offense and he
either knew or had reason to know that his principal would use or
possess a firearm while committing the crime. Id. at 126, 484 A.
2d at 693. In so holding, the court rejected White's argument
that, because he was not armed during the robberies, his conduct
did not fall within the clear language and purpose of the Act. Id.
at 128, 484 A.2d at 694. Justice Schreiber observed that the legislative intent behind the Graves Act was to deter the possession
and use of firearms, id. at 128, 484 A. 2d at 694, and that
although the Act's language might be susceptible to varied constructions, it should be interpreted so as to further that purpose.
Id. at 131-32, 484 A.2d at 696.
In reaching its conclusion, the court examined how an "accomplice" fits within the scheme of the Graves Act. Id. at 128-29,
484 A.2d at 694. Justice Schreiber defined an accomplice as a
person "who acts with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the substantive offense for which he is charged as
an accomplice." Id. at 129, 484 A.2d at 694 (emphasis in original). The court further noted that a person who acts as an accomplice is "legally accountable" for the conduct of a cohort and
that both the accomplice and the cohort are guilty of the crime if
they " 'shared in the intent which is the crime's basic element.' "
Id. at 129, 484 A.2d at 694 (quoting State v. Fair,45 NJ. 77, 95,
211 A.2d 359, 367 (1965)). Based upon those observations, Justice Schreiber reasoned that an accomplice, even if he did not
possess a firearm, has committed the same crime as an individual
who was armed, so long as the accomplice had the requisite intent to promote the crime. Id. at 130, 484 A.2d at 695. The
court thus concluded that, unless the accomplice neither knew
nor had reason to know that his partner possessed a firearm, the
legislative intent to deter the use of firearms compelled application of the Graves Act sanctions to the accomplice. Id. at 130-32,
484 A.2d at 695-96.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Handler asserted that the
Graves Act should not apply to an accomplice who neither possessed nor used a firearm during an armed robbery. Id. at 13233, 484 A.2d at 696 (Handler, J., dissenting). To hold otherwise,
the dissent maintained, would require the court to disavow prior
New Jersey decisions, which Justice Handler construed as requir-
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ing "actual, immediate, and personal possession of a gun by the
offender" in order to render the Graves Act applicable. Id. at
133, 484 A.2d at 697 (Handler, J., dissenting). He emphasized
that the Act mandates an enhanced sentence for one who "used
or was in possession of a firearm," and he criticized the majority
for deviating from that express language. Justice Handler maintained that the Graves Act, as a penal statute, must be construed
strictly and thus cannot be extended by implication to include
sentencing of non-possessory offenders. Id. at 134, 484 A.2d at
697 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The dissent explained that the rule of strict statutory construction is designed to limit the scope of conduct covered by a
penal statute and thus prevent fundamental unfairness and arbitrary enforcement. Id. at 134-35, 484 A.2d at 697 (Handler, J.,
dissenting (citing State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 423 A.2d 294
(1980)). The dissent further noted that those standards of construction, which govern the sentencing provisions of the New
Jersey Criminal Code, "emphasize the objectives of discretionary, enlightened, fair and individualized sentencing." Id. at 135,
484 A.2d at 697 (Handler, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Justice
Handler concluded that, although the guilt of an accomplice may
be the same as that of his principal, sentencing must remain individualized, and that while the Graves Act may govern the determination of the principal's sentence, it would be both unsound
and unfair to impose automatically the sanctions of the Act on his
accomplice. Id. at 135-36, 484 A.2d at 697-98 (Handler, J.,
dissenting).
In White, the New Jersey Supreme Court extended application of the Graves Act in order to impose a five year term of parole ineligibility upon a non-possessory accomplice to an armed
robbery. The majority based its decision upon the laudable goals
of deterring possession and use of firearms, and of discouraging
the substantial increase in violent crimes that has taken place in
New Jersey. By so extending applicability of the Graves Act, the
court has demonstrated that it will go beyond express statutory
language in order to achieve those goals.
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